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Evaluating Real Mortgage Mitigation Options of US 
Subprime Mortgage Homeowners. 
Abstract 
 
We provide a comprehensive model using a bivariate stochastic DTI (Debt to Income) 
and LTV (Loan to Value) formulation to assess the likely contribution of the current 
US government programs(HAMP) to alleviate homeownership financial distress.  In a 
simulation of five available mortgage distress termination options plus continuation 
and repayment, the HAMP program appears to foster mortgage mitigation, given our 
parameter value assumptions. HAMP reduces foreclosures, but also incentivises 
householders to voluntary sell their property at a higher LTV than without a HAMP 
program. It might also reduce a homeowner’s propensity to strategically default. 
However, conclusive policy appraisal awaits satisfactory empirical work regarding 
DTI and LTV drifts and volatilities.   
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Introduction 
Due to exogenous shocks, a significant number of US homeowners are unable to make the 
required monthly mortgage payment (Holden et al. 2012, Quercia, Pennington-Cross and Tian 
2012). Federal mitigation programs such as the Home Affordable Mortgage Program 
(HAMP) are designed to mitigate this inability of homeowners to make the required payment 
rather than their unwillingness to make the payment. How does the homeowner’s inability to 
pay affect the probability of the “ruthless” exercise of strategic default or other options? 
 
To gain insight and develop initial answers to the research objective, we base our analysis on 
exogenous program criteria for entry to the HAMP program (SIGTARP 2010). The program 
aims to make mortgage payments of homeowners with a high debt servicing burden more 
affordable by encouraging renegotiation between lender and homeowner, mitigating the 
effects of other (undesirable) options such as foreclosure or default. 
 
We simulate the relative importance (defined by the likelihood to be exercised) of the 
principal alternative options based on program acceptance criteria to HAMP (SIGTARP 2010, 
Holden et al. 2012). The main benefit of entry to the HAMP program for the homeowner is 
that they negotiate and receive a one off reduction in their mortgage payment servicing for a 
period of 5 years resulting in a DTI close to a recommended value of 0.31 (Holden et al. 
2012). In a methodological sense, we are simulating and examining a complex mixture of 
discrete (time) compound, barrier and reset type options. 
 
We attempt to answer the question as to whether HAMP might mitigate US homeowner’s 
motivation to “strategically” default. The question has not been addressed (see Holden et al. 
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2012 and the growing literature on the topic) in any published academic research but would 
appear a relevant question when discussing the efficacy of any mitigation program. 
 
This paper develops a model around a problem formulation based on exogenous HAMP entry 
criteria, incorporating the stochastic factors (LTV and DTI), to provide an insight into the 
relative likelihood of different mitigation options being exercised. The DTI ratio is a measure 
that compares a homeowner’s debt servicing payments to the income they receive. The LTV 
ratio expresses the amount of a first mortgage lien as a percentage of the total appraised value 
of real property.  
 
We compare the effect of income and home equity change of a prime homeowner and their 
eligibility to enter HAMP on their option exercise under three scenarios: (i) DTI and LTV are 
decreasing and would not satisfy criteria to enter HAMP; (ii) DTI and LTV are increasing and 
would not satisfy criteria to enter HAMP, (iii) DTI and LTV are increasing and would satisfy 
criteria to enter HAMP. 
 
We comment on the expected effect of a HAMP type program on the more typical mitigation 
options such as a “forced foreclosure” or “strategic default” as well as additional real options 
introduced by the relaxation of the perpetual ability to pay constraint such as a “voluntary 
sale”. We demonstrate that a possible effect of the HAMP program is that it makes it less 
likely that a typical US homeowner will default as a result of “unwillingness to pay” but 
rather willingly sell their home as a result of an inability to pay and the desire to recover some 
home equity. The next section discusses the model and methodology.  Then we provide some 
provisional results based on assumed exogenous trigger levels and parameter values.  Finally, 
the last section concludes and points to the empirical work required for policy evaluation.  
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Model and Methodology 
The purpose of the analysis is to consider and estimate the effect that entry to the HAMP 
program might have on the probability of how often common real mortgage default mitigation 
options available to US subprime homeowners might be exercised.  
 
We formulate the problem by defining five real competing mortgage mitigation options 
(Appendix) to occur with a total probability of 1 within the term of the mortgage.  We 
consider two default options, one instead-of-default option and finally two non-default 
options. We follow up by stating the path dependent (on LTV and DTI) assumptions as to 
when each option is exercised. Finally, we describe the mitigation effect of the HAMP 
program within the problem formulation, make assumptions as to how the path dependency of 
the five competing options are modified (or mitigated) and compare the relative probability of 
a mitigating option being exercised to a state of the world without a HAMP program. 
 
The Probability of a Terminal Mortgage Option Occurring 
 
The probability a competing event terminating the term of a mortgage is 1: 
 
P (Strategic Default) + P (Forced Foreclosure) + P (Paid Up) + P (Voluntary Sale) = 1 - P (Other Option)          [1] 
 
We present this concept in a diagrammatic manner in Figure 1 which shows that a US 
homeowner who experiences stochastic LTV and DTI over the term of their mortgage must 
hit one of the termination boundaries or remain within the boundaries (= Other Option).  
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To the right of some arbitrary DTI value X (Can’t Pay) a homeowner will either, as a result, 
of an inability to pay, be foreclosed upon if they have negative equity or voluntary sell their 
home if they have positive equity. Above some arbitrary LTV value Y (Won’t Pay), a 
homeowner will strategically default no matter their DTI. Otherwise the homeowner, who still 
has the ability to pay, will either have a mortgage that is paid up or still current (= other 
option). A typical US homeowner with a subprime mortgage starts with a DTI of 0.31 and 
LTV of 95% (= P, red star) in the diagram. Prime mortgages start further to the left (= P, 
green star) and will have a lower probability of other termination events occurring. 
 
Figure 1.Schematic of Alternative US Mitigation Options without HAMP 
 
Therefore if DTI is an independent random variable in the set 0 < DTI < ∞ and LTV is 
another uncorrelated independent variable in the set 0 < LTV < ∞, X and Y are arbitrarily 
chosen boundaries and a homeowner has either positive or negative equity (defined as ≤ or > 
100%). Equity is loosely defined as the house resale value less the mortgage value. 
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We suggest that: 
P(Strategic Default)   ≡ P(LTV ≥ Y | 0 < DTI < ∞)  + 
P(Voluntary Sale)   ≡ P(LTV ≤ 100% | DTI ≥ X)  +  
P(Paid Up)    ≡ P(LTV < 1% | 0 <DTI < ∞) +  
P(Forced Foreclosure) ≡ P(LTV >100% | DTI ≥ X)   =   
1- P(Other Option)   ≡ 1- P(1% < LTV < X | 0 < DTI < X)   [2] 
The effect of the HAMP program is represented pictorially in Figure 2 whereby US 
homeowners who have a DTI > 0.38 or within the range 90% < LTV ≤ 110% can negotiate 
with their lender, enter HAMP and have their DTI reduced to 0.31. HAMP is a temporary 
mitigating option and does not offer a permanent reduction in DTI as homeowners DTI and 
LTV will then change subsequent to entering the program. However, it is obvious that 
entering the HAMP will affect the relative probabilities of any of the terminal options 
expressed in [2] being exercised. 
Figure 2. Schematic of Alternative US Mitigation Options with HAMP 
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An appropriate approach for this particular path dependent barrier type problem formulation 
is to simulate, using a Monte Carlo approach, the effect of increasing stochastic and DTI on 
the exercise likelihood of a US homeowner’s mortgage options. Firstly, the ability of the 
homeowner to pay must be checked (1
st 
DTI Trigger) and only subsequently the willingness 
of the homeowner to pay (2
nd 
LTV Trigger) – a so called double trigger.  If the first trigger 
shows that the homeowner has the ability to pay, then the available real options reduce to 
those of strategic default, paid up and other option. If, however, the homeowner is unable to 
pay, then two other real options are introduced, namely the lender forecloses or the 
homeowner voluntarily sells the property. 
 
We introduce an additional feature into our simulation model whereby a mortgage event is not 
immediately triggered if one of the stochastic factors e.g. DTI (ability to pay) hits a threshold 
value in one period but only if it consistently exceeds the threshold for a number of periods. 
This is not a continuous but rather a discrete time simulation with discrete large monthly time 
periods. This feature simply reflects the observation that lenders and homeowners do not 
generally exercise an option immediately in the period following the first missed payment or 
reduction in home equity. At this juncture, we briefly review the path dependent barrier 
option literature in the context of the problem as formulated above.  
 
Barrier options are one of the oldest types of exotic options trading since 1967 on the Chicago 
Board of Options Exchange (Zhang 1998). As a result, literature on exotic barrier options is 
abundant (Zhang 1998, Wilmott 2006). Snyder (1969) outlined the general approach with a 
single stochastic variable and a lower barrier which was later extended to multiple stochastic 
variables and barriers of different forms and durations (Heynen and Kat 1994, 1996).  
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However, examination of the literature has not yielded specific research or papers which lend 
themselves to a closed form solution of the formulated problem. On the other hand, Wilmott 
(2006) suggests that a Monte Carlo methodology is often the best approach with regard to 
analysing exotic path dependent options, as it is simple to code with a likelihood of fewer 
mistakes and whose only disadvantages are the difficulty of obtaining the Greeks and its 
slowness, both of which are minor issues in our formulation. This view is also supported by 
Vandell (1995) when discussing specific problem formulations associated with an extension 
of the standard option theoretic problem from a simple bivariate stochastic formulation. 
 
To illustrate the methodological complexity and appropriateness of the chosen approach we 
make the following observations about our specific formulation. It is of a discrete Asian 
nature (monthly) and significant errors would be introduced by treating it as a continuous time 
option (Zhang 1998). Our formulation might appear at first sight to be a simple bivariate 
option with LTV and DTI as independent variables but this is not so, as DTI and LTV 
combine in a sequential or compound manner (double trigger action) to knock out the 
mortgage and trigger a terminal payoff option. Our problem is also less straight forward than 
many barrier options treated in the literature as in our specific case the homeowner’s DTI is 
reset to 0.31 but the LTV is not reset on hitting the HAMP reset barrier of 0.38.  
 
We make no assumption about the amount of the monthly payment beyond that a repayment 
formula or schedule is contractually agreed beforehand and that failure by the homeowner to 
make the agreed payment on time constitutes a trigger event changing their mortgage status. 
Let                 be the number of (monthly) periods over which the homeowner 
discovers their “true” DTI and “true” LTV respectively before exercising a mortgage option. 
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Let   = a unique US residential owner occupied mortgage homeowner where        and 
  = number of homeowners in the simulation. We let      years be the term of the 
mortgage and         the number of payment periods implying monthly payments.  
 
Implicit in this model formulation is that both the homeowner’s DTI and LTV processes are 
significant, independent and non-correlated. Mortgage literature (Campbell and Dietrich 
1983, Vandell and Thibodeau 1985) does not contradict this view as empirical research has 
demonstrated that these two factors are both highly significant but essentially independent.  
 
One might argue that these two factors should be significantly correlated as both might 
depend in some fashion on interest rates. However, it should be clear from the model 
formulation that we only model short term monthly shocks and although interest rates may 
effect long term property and income trends, current evidence from mortgage literature would 
suggest that it is short term shocks which trigger default and mitigation, and these shocks are 
independent of spot interest rate changes. 
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The DTI Factor 
This measure is of prime importance and significance within the US mortgage industry as its 
initial value at origination and consequent development gives lenders an idea of how likely it 
is that the homeowner will be able to repay the loan over its full term. We do not make any 
distinction within our model as to why DTI is changing as a result of variations in both 
income and/or debt servicing requirements and housing expenses. The change in housing 
expenses could be due to any number of reasons ranging from interest rate changes to 
property taxes or mortgage insurance. During normal times, most US lender  underwriting 
standards tended to adopt a value of 0.28 as a maximum upper limit for DTI at mortgage 
initiation. We adopt 0.18 for DTI at mortgage origination, a value considered more typical for 
prime mortgages. Our exogenous triggers are motivated by the following considerations. 
 
We assume (Holden et al. 2012, Quercia, Pennington-Cross and Tian 2012) that a homeowner 
will have significant ability to pay constraints if their DTI is above 0.5 for at least three 
consecutive payment periods and will most likely be foreclosed upon. The HAMP program 
applies a maximum limit of 0.38 to a homeowner’s DTI that is reduced to 0.31 using a 
waterfall method (Holden et al. 2012) on successful entry to the program. 
 
We assume that the DTI ratio of any homeowner  , denoted by D, follows the simple 
geometric Brownian motion process given by 
                 [3] 
   is the instantaneous expected rate of change of the DTI ratio 
  is the instantaneous variance of the DTI ratio 
  is a standard Brownian motion.  
We make the simplifying assumption that all homeowners have the same   ,    and   . 
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The LTV Factor 
We again take a simple approach and assume that the LTV is a result of many factors. With 
no change in property price, for the majority of homeowners, the LTV will gradually decrease 
from month to month as they pay down the loan principal. For others, due to any number of 
reasons varying from non-payment of principal to a reduction in property prices the LTV may 
be static or increase. The LTV is only appraised (precisely) once at mortgage initiation and 
again by the lender or servicing agent in the event of default. Otherwise, the LTV is 
calculated by the homeowner and lender based on the outstanding principal and arrears as 
well as a very rough estimation of the property price based on local (if known) property prices 
or indexes. In the US, conforming loans that meet Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac underwriting 
guidelines are limited to an LTV ratio that is less than or equal to 80% at origination, a value 
which we assume in the simulation model. Our exogenous triggers are motivated by the 
following considerations. 
 
We define a higher LTV trigger of 150% in our model as the boundary where a homeowner 
will decide to “strategically” default because of the negative payoff received by subtracting 
the mortgage from the value of the property collateral. The 150 % LTV has been chosen 
somewhat arbitrarily but is consistent with empirical papers by Gerardi, Foote and Willen 
(2008) or Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2009). We also include a lower boundary at LTV < 
1% where the mortgage is effectively paid down and terminated. 
 
A relatively wide range of homeowners are eligible to participate in the HAMP program 
based on equity or LTV criteria ranging from those with a small percentage of positive equity 
(LTV > 90%) up to those with negative equity (LTV < 110%). We note that the HAMP 
programs LTV criteria were recently increased again in June 2012 to 120% (Holden et al. 
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2012). Currently the 120% limit is one that has been adopted within the HAMP program as a 
“typical” LTV break point (Holden et al 2012). We have adopted the lower 110% barrier, 
basing our analysis on the original HAMP criteria. 
 
We assume that if the homeowner has the ability to pay (< 0.5 DTI for three consecutive 
periods), that where the homeowner’s LTV is above 110% for the same three consecutive 
periods, they will enter and participate in the HAMP program as an alternative to strategically 
defaulting.  
 
We assume that the LTV ratio of any homeowner  , denoted by L, follows the geometric 
Brownian motion process given by 
 
                 [4] 
 Where   
  is the instantaneous expected rate of change of the LTV ratio 
  is the instantaneous variance of the LTV ratio 
  is a standard Brownian motion.  
We make the simplifying assumption that all homeowners have the same   ,    and   . 
 
The Interaction of LTV and DTI – the Double Trigger Effect 
We summarise the alternative mitigation options available to the homeowner as well as the 
program logic of the exercise barriers in Table 1. We assume for ease of explanation that a 
homeowner is not initially in a HAMP program. At the end of each monthly period, the 1
st
 
DTI trigger is simulated and compared against the exogenous triggers and subsequently the 
2
nd
 LTV trigger.  
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Should any of the conditions described in Table 1 (No HAMP Program) persist for longer 
than 3 months then that particular terminal option is triggered. If the government then 
introduces a HAMP program and the homeowner meets the entry criteria as specified in Table 
1 (With a HAMP Program) then the homeowner enters HAMP and their status changes from 
0 to 1 and DTI is reset to 0.31. They then are subject to the same periodical simulation (as 
without a HAMP Program (Table 1, Whereupon) and do not qualify for a DTI reset again. 
 
Table 1. Table of Exogenous Trigger Values for the Option Simulation Program 
HAMP Status 1st DTI Trigger   2nd LTV Trigger Option Description 
    No HAMP Program   
   IF  AND THEN 
0 DTI < 0.5 1% < LTV < 150% Other Option 
0 DTI < 0.5           LTV ≤ 1% Paid Up 
0 DTI < 0.5           LTV ≥ 150% Strategic Default 
0 DTI ≥ 0.5           LTV < 100% Voluntary Sale 
0 DTI ≥ 0.5           LTV ≥ 100% Foreclosure 
    With a HAMP Program   
  IF OR THEN 
0 -> 1  DTI ≥ 0.38 LTV ≥  110% Enter HAMP =>  DTI Resets to 0.31 
    Whereupon   
   IF  AND THEN 
1 DTI < 0.5 1% < LTV < 150% Other Option 
1 DTI < 0.5           LTV ≤ 1% Paid Up 
1 DTI < 0.5           LTV ≥ 150% Strategic Default 
1 DTI ≥ 0.5           LTV < 100% Voluntary Sale 
1 DTI ≥ 0.5           LTV ≥ 100% Foreclosure 
    Note: An option is triggered only if DTI or LTV are at a trigger level for at least consecutive three monthly periods 
 
We also consider the appropriateness of treating both DTI and LTV as standard log normal 
gBm processes. This assumption is relatively uncontroversial for LTV (Vandell 1995) but 
may be open to discussion in relation to DTI and the underlying income dynamics. 
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Income distribution and dynamics is difficult to simulate and the measurement and 
interpretation of US homeowner’s income is even more fraught than the measurement of 
property values and subject to many caveats.  
 
However, recent empirical research by Quercia, Pennington-Cross and Tian (2012) would 
suggest that DTI for low and moderate income US households is in the first instance 
symmetrically distributed with a bell shaped distribution.  
 
An examination of literature on US homeowner income dynamics (e.g. Gottschalk and 
Moffitt 2009) does not provide evidence that other formulations such as mean reverting 
income is more widely used or provides any better results than the simpler standard geometric 
Brownian motion. Although a homeowner’s income may revert over the longer term, this is of 
no consequence to the homeowner or lender who are faced with short to medium term 
payment difficulties. The HAMP program also has a relatively short duration of 5 years 
leading us to choose a standard geometric Brownian motion stochastic process.   
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Simulated Results and Interpretation 
Initially we assume that a US homeowner with a subprime mortgage at origination has a DTI 
= 0.31 and a LTV = 95%. We define a worst case (economic) scenario as where the 
homeowners’ LTV and DTI are increasing at a rate of 2% per year, and a best case scenario as 
where LTV and DTI are reducing by 2% per year. We assume that no HAMP type program is 
available in the best-case scenario but is introduced in a worst-case type scenario to 
homeowners who meet qualifying criteria.  
 
We take the same global approach to analysing each individual terminal option. 
 
1) We compare the percentage homeowners who exercise with a HAMP type program to 
a state of the world without a HAMP type program for different volatility parameters.  
 
2) We estimate the terminal change in LTV from mortgage origination. This indicates 
(but does not quantify) whether entry to the HAMP program “preserves” or “destroys” 
LTV (a measure of equity) for the homeowner. 
 
We demonstrate the outcome of the model parameters on the exercise probability of 
foreclosure option in detail, presenting and discussing both figures and tables, by way of 
example and will later dispense with the detailed explanations of the figures for the other 
options to aid clarity. The reader may obtain the wider range of graphical information on 
request. 
Foreclosure Option – Volatility Effects 
Foreclosure occurs when a homeowner’s income (modelled by DTI) is not sufficient to make 
the monthly payment and they have not enough wealth or equity (modelled by LTV) in their 
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property whereby a voluntary sale (or downsizing) would pay off the loan. The y axis of the 
four subplots in Figure 3 represents the percentage homeowners who exercise the foreclosure 
option. The x axis of the top two subplots (3a,b) respectively worse and best case represents 
the LTV (  ) volatility while the x axis on the bottom two subplots (3c,d) represent DTI (  ) 
volatility.  
Figure 3 Percentage Homeowners Foreclosed as a Function of LTV (  ) and DTI (  ) Volatility 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We show four trend lines in each subplot. In the top two subplots (3a,b), representing the 
percentage of homeowners exercising foreclosure plotted against LTV (  ) volatility, we 
show trend lines for DTI (  ) = 20% (dashed trend line) and 40% (continuous trend line). In 
the bottom two subplots (3c,d) representing the percentage of homeowners exercising 
foreclosure plotted against DTI (  ) volatility, we show trend lines for LTV (  ) = 20% 
Worst Case Best Case 
Worst Case Best Case 
Simulation Parameters
σl , μl , μl , σd , μd , μd  = Variable, Delay Trigger for DTI and LTV=3 months, Term Period = 360 months, Strategic Default LTV Trigger = 150%
Voluntary Sales DTI Trigger = 0.5, HAMP DTI Trigger = 0.38, HAMP DTI Reset = 0.31, HAMP LTV Trigger = 110%, Number of Householders = 100,000
3a 3b 
3c 3d 
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(dashed trend line) and 40% (continuous trend line). Red lines represent results without any 
(NO) HAMP program – the status quo in good economic times. Black lines represent results 
when a HAMP type program is available. 
 
Comparing the two left hand sub plots to the two right hand sub plots, foreclosures decrease 
as the homeowner’s economic circumstances improve. Foreclosures increase linearly with 
increasing DTI volatility (3c,d subplots). 
 
With increasing LTV volatility (3a,b subplots) foreclosures decrease at moderate to high 
levels of LTV volatility. Increasing LTV volatility therefore offers some homeowners the 
opportunity to benefit from increased positive equity and reduces the likelihood of 
foreclosure. Lower LTV volatility, on the other hand, reduces the likelihood that a 
homeowner with negative equity will ever have positive equity.  
 
It should be noted that some other homeowners are more likely as a result to exercise the 
strategic default option at these higher LTV volatilities. In contrast to other mitigation 
options, little change in the percentage of homeowners exercising this option occurs at higher 
LTV volatility but all the “action” takes place at low to moderate levels of LTV volatility.  
 
Table 2, column 2 summarises (for   ,   = 20% and 40%) the percentage (of N=50,000) 
homeowners exercising a particular option during the best and worst cases depicted in Figure 
3. The right hand sub table is the best-case scenario i.e. where LTV and DTI are decreasing 
by 2% a year and the left hand sub table is the worst-case scenario where LTV and DTI are 
increasing by 2% a year. Each individual sub table summarises the percentage of homeowners 
who exercise one of 6 options – numbered 1-6. The top half of each sub table shows the 
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results for a HAMP program and the bottom half for NO HAMP program. Finally results are 
presented for different combinations of LTV and DTI volatility with    ,   = 20% and 40%. 
 
Table 2 The Effect of LTV (  ) and DTI (  ) Volatility on Homeowner Option Exercise Frequency 
 
The introduction of a HAMP program would lead to reduced foreclosures. From Table 2 (best 
case, RHS column 2) which summarises key parameters from the simulations for a LTV (  ) 
and DTI (  ) volatility of 20%, approximately 4.2% of homeowners will be foreclosed upon 
in a best-case scenario without a HAMP program (NH). When the homeowner’s economic 
situation worsens (worse case, LHS column 2) this increases to 11.8% without a HAMP 
program (NH) but reduces to 6.6% with a HAMP program (H).  
Simulation Parameters
Delay Trigger for DTI and LTV=3 months, Term Period = 360 months, Strategic Default LTV Trigger = 150%, H =HAMP Program, NH = NO HAMP program, σl and σd  = 20% or 40%
Voluntary Sales DTI Trigger = 0.5, HAMP DTI Trigger = 0.38, HAMP DTI Reset = 0.31, HAMP LTV Trigger = 110%, Number of Householders = 100,000
Column Option Descriptions : Percentage Homeowners who 1 = Voluntarily Sell, 2 = Forceclose, 3 = Strategically Default, 4 = Otrher Options, 5 = Paid Up, 6 = Enter HAMP
Note that the sum of the columns in the case of a HAMP program will be greater than 100% indicating that some of those who enter HAMP early in the term will
eventually terminally exercise another option later such as e.g a Voluntary Sale.
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Voluntary Sales Option – Volatility Effects 
Voluntary sales occur when the homeowner’s DTI is not sufficient to make the periodic 
payment over a three-month period but enough positive equity (as determined by LTV) exists 
in the property to allow a voluntary sale. We analyse the voluntary sales option in a similar 
manner to that described for the foreclosure option. In the interest of brevity, we will not 
repeat the analytical procedure or present the same graphical figures but rather use the 
summary results in (option) column 1 of Table 2. 
 
Overall homeowners exercise the voluntary sales option more often as the economy 
deteriorates. From Table 2 (best-case scenario, column 1) for a LTV (  ) and DTI (  ) 
volatility of 20% approximately 19.7% of homeowners will voluntarily sell in a best-case 
scenario when NO HAMP program is available. When the homeowner’s economic 
circumstances deteriorate (worst-case scenario, column 1) this increases to 29.6% without the 
presence of a HAMP program but reaches 46.1% with a HAMP program. HAMP induces a 
large increase in voluntary sales by homeowners- a desirable outcome from the viewpoint of 
lenders and regulators, because the forbearance effect created by resetting DTI is such that the 
increase in some homeowner’s LTV leads to more voluntary sales. 
Strategic Default Option – Volatility Effects 
The strategic default option is exercised regardless of the DTI if the negative equity of the 
homeowner as determined by the LTV reaches 150%.  
 
As the economy deteriorates the number of homeowners exercising the strategic default 
option increases significantly. However, examining the values in Table 2, (worst case 
scenario, column 3) the introduction of the HAMP program might see strategic default 
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increasing from 25.4% to 37.0% as compared to an increase from 25.4% to 43.2% with NO 
HAMP program - a 7% reduction.  
 
A HAMP type program might induce roughly 15% fewer people to strategically default which 
might be seen as a desirable outcome by lenders and regulators. 
Paid Up Option – Volatility Effects 
This option is exercised if the LTV of the homeowner is below 1% over a three-month period. 
Effectively, the mortgage is repaid and it is extremely unlikely that any other option will be 
exercised.  
 
As might be expected, when the economy deteriorates the number of homeowners exercising 
the paid up option decreases. The option is insensitive to whether or not a HAMP type 
program is available with the same number of homeowners exercising the option regardless. 
Thus, one could conclude that the availability of a HAMP type program should have little 
effect on the rate at which some homeowners pay off their mortgages. 
Other Option – Volatility Effects 
Homeowners who are still current and have never entered a HAMP type program (if 
available) within the three month period at the end of the computer simulation are deemed to 
have exercised the Other Option.  
 
With deteriorating economic conditions, the percentage homeowners exercising the other 
option decreases from 50.6% to 15.3% with NO HAMP program (table worst case scenario, 
column 6 and (with a HAMP program) further reduces to 3.8% because of homeowners 
exercising other options and because around 27% of homeowners remain in the HAMP 
program at the end of the term (because of entering HAMP after 25 years).  
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How Much is the LTV Change Affected by the Option Exercised? 
We now address our second analytical question to discover what effect the introduction of a 
HAMP program has on the average change in LTV from mortgage origination compared to a 
NO HAMP scenario. This might help increase our understanding of whether homeowners 
who enter HAMP experience beneficial changes in LTV from a scenario where NO HAMP 
program is available? Strictly speaking, rational homeowners should only be motivated by 
future expectations but it is not unreasonable to assume, that notwithstanding HAMP benefits 
and lender forbearance, that the average US homeowner may compare terminal LTV to LTV 
at origination. Similarly, even if rational lenders only consider NPV (Holden et al. 2012) they 
may also be concerned with their loan losses and the net change in LTV of their mortgage 
loans and customer’s DTI from origination. 
 
We assume that the difference in LTV between mortgage origination and the exercise of a 
terminal option such as strategic default, forced foreclosure or voluntary sale gives a measure 
of the change in equity to the homeowner (and therefore the lender risk). The difference, 
depending on the type of option, can be negative or positive as demonstrated in the histogram 
in Figure 4 for a simulation of 100,000 US homeowners in a worst case scenario with HAMP. 
Figure 4 Change in LTV from Mortgage Origination for those Exercising the Voluntary Sale Option 
 
 
Simulation Parameters
Delay Trigger for DTI and LTV=3 months, Term Period = 360 months, Strategic Default LTV Trigger = 150%
Voluntary Sales DTI Trigger = 0.5, HAMP DTI Trigger = 0.38, HAMP DTI Reset = 0.31, HAMP LTV Trigger = 110%, Number of Householders = 100,000
Worse Case = μd = μl = 0.02, , H =HAMP Program,  σl = σd = 20%, LTV0 = 81%, DTI0 = 0.18
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We construct the histogram by selecting those homeowners who exercise the option and 
divide these into LTV “buckets” across a (change in LTV) range from -100% to +20%. 
Finally, we numerically integrate the area to calculate the mean change in LTV from 
origination for those homeowners. We report the mean of the changes in LTV in Table 3 for 
the voluntary sale, forced foreclosure and strategic default options. 
Table 3 Table of Homeowners Option Exercise Frequency and Average Change in LTV from to. 
 
 
 
 
Voluntarily Sale Option – LTV Effects 
For            we calculate (table 3 column 1) a mean change in LTV of  -36.9% in the 
best case No HAMP situation, -29.3% in the worst case NO HAMP situation and -20.3% in 
the worst case HAMP situation. Homeowners, exercising the voluntary sale option after 
entering a HAMP type program have a LTV that is on average 9% higher at option exercise 
compared to when NO HAMP is available.  
 
Although the mean LTV has decreased for both the HAMP and NO HAMP cases in the worst 
case scenario, because homeowners “hang in” longer by entering the HAMP program and 
gaining the DTI reset benefit, they also “lose” more equity due to a higher LTV at 
termination.  
% Homeowners Exercising Change in LTV from t0
1 2 3 1 2 3
Best Case NH σd=0.2 σl=0.2 19.7 4.2 25.4 -36.9% 24.0% 69.7%
Worse Case NH σd=0.2 σl=0.2 29.6 11.8 43.2 -29.3% 26.1% 70.4%
Worse Case H σd=0.2 σl=0.2 46.1 6.6 37.0 -20.3% 28.2% 70.5%
Simulation Parameters
Delay Trigger for DTI and LTV=3 months, Term Period = 360 months, Strategic Default LTV Trigger = 150%, H =HAMP Program, NH = NO HAMP program
Voluntary Sales DTI Trigger = 0.5, HAMP DTI Trigger = 0.38, HAMP DTI Reset = 0.31, HAMP LTV Trigger = 110%, Number of Householders = 100,000
Worse Case = μd = μl = 0.02,  Best Case = μd = μl = -0.02, σl = σd = 20% or 40%,LTV0 = 95%, DTI0 = 0.31
Column Option Descriptions : Percentage Homeowners who 1 = Voluntarily Sell, 2 = Forceclose, 3 = Strategically Default.
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Forced Foreclosure Option – LTV Effects 
For            we calculate (table 3 column 2) a change in LTV of 24% in the best case 
No HAMP situation, 26.1% in the worst case NO HAMP situation and 28.2% in the worst 
case HAMP situation. Homeowners, being foreclosed upon after entering a HAMP type 
program, have a LTV that is on average 2.1% higher compared to NO HAMP which appears 
beneficial to homeowners but (perhaps) at the expense of lenders. 
Strategic Default Option – LTV Effects 
We can conclude (table 3, column 3) that the change in homeowners’ LTV from mortgage 
origination is almost identical where a HAMP program exists than where NO HAMP program 
exists. We calculate a change in LTV of 69.7% in the best case NO HAMP situation, 70.4% 
in the worst case NO HAMP and 70.5% in the worst case HAMP situation.  
 
In other words, homeowners, defaulting even with a HAMP type program, have a change in 
equity that is the same compared to a NO HAMP type situation. Lenders are no worse off 
with respect to defaults in terms of the losses they might suffer on loans. However, they 
(might) still gain from the much greater number of homeowners who voluntarily sell. 
Homeowners who enter HAMP have of course benefitted from the DTI reset. 
 
Model Validation 
We stress that this paper is purely a theoretical contribution based on commonly accepted 
HAMP exogenous parameters and the model results have not been validated empirically. 
However, we believe that the dynamic behaviour and magnitude of the results appear 
intuitively correct and may bear some resemblance to “reality”. Conclusions drawn might 
indicate at a macro level the possible effect of policy changes in HAMP trigger parameters 
and subsequent medium term effect on householder’s  option exercise probabilities.  
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To compare our results with “reality”, we present in Figure 6 an extrapolation of two 
delinquency rates at 2% and 12% on the mortgage survival of 100,000 homeowners over a 30 
year period. A pre-2006 delinquency rate of 2% is reported by the OCC Integrated Banking 
System in Spring 2013, but 12% since 2009. We next compare the extrapolation against our 
general model results using a DTI = 0.18 and LTV = 85% (combining foreclosure and 
strategic default probabilities) using the worst case parameters. As already noted, our model 
result has a characteristic seasoning effect and furthermore the “average” seems to lie around 
the 2% pre-2006 trend. Therefore, our model underestimates the current high US delinquency 
rates. This underestimation arises because we overestimate the number of US homeowners 
who enter HAMP. Introducing modelling rules which reduce the number of homeowners 
participating in HAMP increases the number choosing other terminal options. 
 
Figure 5 Comparison of Two Delinquency Rates vs Model Predictions on 100,000 Homeowners 
 
Simulation Parameters
Delay Trigger for DTI and LTV=3 months, Term Period = 360 months, Strategic Default LTV Trigger = 150%, H =HAMP Program, NH = NO HAMP program, σl and σd  = 20% or 40%
Voluntary Sales DTI Trigger = 0.5, HAMP DTI Trigger = 0.38, HAMP DTI Reset = 0.31, HAMP LTV Trigger = 110%, Number of Householders = 100,000
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Conclusion 
We conclude by summarising the main findings at our reference volatilities of   ,   = 20%. 
We examine the simulated effect of HAMP on real mortgage mitigation options and by 
extension answer our question as to whether ignoring the ability to pay of homeowners is 
justified by its assumed  “limited” effect on strategic default and foreclosure (Vandell 1995). 
We repeat that the outcomes of the HAMP program are very dependent on the initial LTV and 
DTI at origination which in this exposition are assumed to be subprime mortgage 
homeowners. 
 
1) A HAMP type program leads to a significant increase in subprime homeowners 
exercising the voluntary sales option from 29.6% to 46.1% - a desirable outcome from 
the viewpoint of homeowners, lenders and regulators due to the (presumed) reduced 
associated deadweight costs. This occurs because the temporary mitigation effect 
created by lowering the DTI of homeowners is such that the positive development of 
some homeowner’s LTV due to higher volatility induces more voluntary sales. This 
conclusion might, however, be difficult to verify empirically as it is probably not easy 
to divine homeowners’ motivations for selling.  
 
2) Forced foreclosures double during the lifetime of a HAMP program from 11.8% to 
6.6% which would seem a desirable outcome to homeowners and regulators alike. 
 
3) A HAMP type program induces roughly 15% fewer subprime homeowners to 
strategically default which might also be seen as a desirable outcome by lenders and 
regulators.  In better economic circumstances, the most common terminal option 
chosen is the strategic default option (25.4%, Table 2). When economic conditions 
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worsen, although the percentage of homeowners that strategically default increases to 
37.0% (with HAMP), this increase is much less than the increase in voluntary sales to 
43.2% from 19.7%. The HAMP program is certainly not a “free rider” program.  
 
A unique aspect of this simulation model is the ability to compare the homeowner’s final 
equity worth as approximated by their LTV to that at mortgage origination. Although general 
LTV drift is positive (i.e. value is destroyed) during an economic crisis we simply pose the 
question whether the HAMP program is more likely to “create” or “destroy” more or less 
equity (LTV) value for homeowners or lenders compared to NO HAMP program. In this 
regard, we presume that strategic defaults are “good” for homeowners and “bad” for lenders 
while voluntary sales and foreclosures can be either “good” or “bad” depending on the 
terminal LTV with or without a HAMP program. 
 
4)  Subprime homeowners who exercise the voluntary sale option from within a HAMP 
program have a LTV that is on average 9% higher compared to a NO HAMP type 
situation. Except at very low LTV volatilities, homeowners are worse off in terms of 
their terminal LTV by waiting longer to sell their property. Homeowners benefit from 
the reduction in mortgage payments but at the expense of more negative equity when 
they eventually sell their home. The HAMP program is therefore not a “free ride” 
charter.  
 
5) Subprime homeowners, being foreclosed upon after entering a HAMP type program, 
have a LTV that is on average 2.1% higher compared to a NO HAMP type situation. 
Lenders are consequently slightly worse off with respect to foreclosures in terms of 
the losses they might suffer on loans. However, this might well be compensated by 
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their gain or lower loss from the much greater number of homeowners who voluntarily 
sell. 
 
6)  With respect to the strategic default option, a subprime homeowners’ average 
terminal LTV is almost identical after entry to the HAMP program than where NO 
HAMP program exists. Lenders are no worse off with respect to strategic defaults in 
terms of the losses they might suffer on loans. However, they still gain from the much 
greater number of homeowners who voluntarily sell. It is a moot point whether the 
homeowner will take the presence of a HAMP program into account when considering 
their strategic default decision. On the other hand, they will gladly make use of any 
DTI reduction. It remains difficult for regulators or lenders to design a mitigation 
program where strategic defaulters do not attempt to game to their own advantage. 
 
 
These form the main conclusions from our study of how we might expect terminal options 
such as voluntary sales, foreclosure and strategic default to behave in the short to medium 
term given the presence of a HAMP type program.  
 
The main effect using this model is that a HAMP program steers more US subprime 
homeowners towards a voluntary sale and slightly reduces the number of defaults and 
foreclosures. This outcome, depending on deadweight default costs, is most likely to be 
advantageous to US homeowners and lenders.  
 
Unfortunately, the two main options in percentage terms, affected by the HAMP program, 
voluntary sales and strategic default, are notoriously difficult to measure empirically. It will 
29 
 
remain difficult for opponents and supporters of the HAMP program to conclusively assess its 
benefit to US society. We have demonstrated that, due to its immediate benefit to distressed 
US homeowners - the significant increase in voluntary sales and reduction of strategic 
defaults with the consequent reduction in default deadweight costs, it is probably better to 
have a HAMP program in place rather than having NO HAMP program. 
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Appendix  
 
Forced Foreclosure 
Forced foreclosure occurs when a homeowner does not have sufficient income, as determined 
by DTI, to make the monthly payment to the lender. We assume that the homeowner has no 
savings or other means of paying down the loan. Furthermore, the LTV or homeowner’s  
equity is negative such that a voluntary sale is of no interest to the homeowner or lender. The 
option is triggered by the lender if the homeowner is delinquent over a number of monthly 
periods.  
 
Voluntary Sale 
Voluntary sale occurs when a homeowner does not have sufficient income, as determined by 
DTI, to make the monthly payment to the lender. We assume that the homeowner has no 
savings or other means of paying down the loan. However, in contrast to the forced 
foreclosure option, enough positive equity exists in the property to make a voluntary sale 
attractive to the borrower as the least worse option.  
 
Strategic Default 
Strategic default occurs where a homeowner considers that the amount of negative equity in 
the property as determined by LTV is such that it makes more sense to permanently default on 
all future payments and “put” the property to the lender. The homeowner may have enough 
income (DTI) to make the mortgage payment but their other assets or wealth might be so low 
that it is of little benefit for the lender to pursue the borrower for the difference between the 
mortgage amount and the realised house value. 
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Paid Up 
We assume that this option is exercised if the LTV of the property falls below 1% through 
either appreciation of the property value or reduction in the outstanding loan, as most 
homeowners whose property has a LTV of less than 1% will not consider exercising other 
options such as default or prepayment due to their expense and risk.  
 
Other Option 
Homeowners that have never exercised one of the four previous (terminal) options will 
therefore have an “Other Option” status. In other words, they continue to make due periodic 
payments to lenders when the model stops computing after the term period of 30 years. They 
are thus not necessarily “current” as it is possible that they are into (e.g. first month of) 
payment difficulties.  
 
